Daniel Kahneman

Record year1979–1992

summary1979 presented models of reference dependence, the value function, and decision weights; in 1992 the same authors changed them into a cumulative representation, extending multi-outcome/uncertain choice and correcting the boundary of stochastic dominance.

M rationaleCASBS, SEP, and the 1992 original paper support the two authors' model evolution. M6.7 is assigned for original-model foundation, cumulative revision, and scope of extension; 1992 is not treated as an external successor, nor is M duplicated by two papers.

attribution rationaleTversky/Kahneman each .34, team .05, prior work .15, institutions .04, unresolved .08.

overlap boundaryThe original 1979 prospect theory and Tversky/Kahneman's 1992 cumulative prospect theory: reference points, the value function, probability weighting, and treating multi-outcome/uncertain choices by cumulative probabilities; do not claim financial markets, policy, or all behavioral economics.

Evidence gapsThe division of labor between the 1979/1992 authors, data inputs, and the actual predictive increment of the cumulative revision still require original-manuscript archives.

Record year1970s–1980s

summaryUsed a series of experiments to show predictable departures in judgment due to simplified heuristics and presentation frames, and provided a testable classification.

M rationaleThe joint-paper bibliography confirms representative works on heuristics and framing. M6.3 is assigned for testable psychological mechanisms and a research agenda across tasks; differences in replication, task dependence, and the risk of mistaking description for universal causal prescription all limit M.

attribution rationaleTversky .31, Kahneman .31, research execution .07, prior work .16, institutions .04, unresolved .11.

overlap boundaryThe body of joint experiments and discussions on representativeness, availability, anchoring, and framing effects from the 1970s through the 1980s; it excludes prospect theory's formal risk model and does not claim all behavioral economics, policy applications, or successor replications.

Evidence gapsSample sizes, materials, research assistants, and replication boundaries for individual experiments remain unresolved.

Record year1968–1984

summaryOrganized a program on attentional resources and effort through physiological indicators and task studies, then tested the cost of visual filtering in collaborative papers of 1983–84 and updated views of attention and automaticity.

M rationaleThe sole-authored program and later joint experiments form a continuous, testable family of attention research, estimated at M5.7; dates and authors are corrected using publication catalogues, and M does not change mechanically with the accessibility of the literature.

attribution rationaleDaniel Kahneman .49; Anne Treisman .08; J. Burkell .02; L. Onuska .01; R. Wolman .01; W. S. Peavler .01; B. Tursky .01; D. Shapiro .01; A. Crider .01; P. Wright .01; R. Ben-Ishai .01; M. Lotan .01; prior work on attention, perception, and cognitive capacity .18; contemporaneous research and original publishing institutions .04; unresolved attribution budget .10. Attribution budgets are revisable research judgments.

overlap boundaryIncludes the 1968–73 experiments on attention and mental effort, Kahneman's 1973 sole-authored book Attention and Effort, and the 1983–84 papers on visual filtering and conceptions of attention coauthored with Anne Treisman and J. Burkell; it does not mistake Treisman's acknowledgment in the preface for 1973 coauthorship, nor claim her independent theories.

Evidence gapsThe book and article texts have not all been read in full; the preface establishes only that Treisman was an intellectual influence, not that she was a 1973 coauthor.

Record year2011

summaryOrganized dispersed research into a unified narrative, illustrations, and a public point of entry.

M rationaleA complete public synthesis book has independent value as a text and vehicle for dissemination, estimated at M5.4; it does not reclaim the theoretical value of the original research, and its scope is limited by risks of simplification, replication disputes, and excessive dichotomization.

attribution rationaleDaniel Kahneman .48; original research corpus on judgment, attention, and decision-making .24; the book's editorial and publishing team .10; prior work on dual-process thinking and popular science writing .10; unresolved attribution budget .08. Attribution budgets are revisable research judgments.

overlap boundaryCounts only the new selection, explanation, and dissemination vehicle by which the 2011 book organized research on judgment, attention, and decision-making into a public-readable synthesis; the original knowledge value of heuristics and biases, prospect theory, and attention research remains at the original outcome points.

Evidence gapsIt has not been read and checked chapter by chapter, and editorial division of labor and reader effects have not been closed; publisher marketing descriptions do not establish theoretical accuracy or social impact.

Record year1997–2006

summaryDistinguished decision utility, momentary experience, and retrospective evaluation, and delivered a survey method for reconstructing episodes of daily life to reduce substitution by a single overall recall.

M rationaleThe conceptual distinctions and implementable survey method constitute an independent measurement outcome spanning theory and research tools, estimated at M6.0; the method still relies on recall, segmentation, and samples and cannot serve as a universal account of happiness or a causal prescription.

attribution rationaleDaniel Kahneman .24; Peter Wakker .07; Rakesh Sarin .07; Alan Krueger .05; David Schkade .05; Norbert Schwarz .05; Arthur Stone .05; Jason Riis .04; the experienced-utility and Day Reconstruction research team .05; prior work on utility, hedonic psychology, and survey methods .16; Princeton and original publishing institutions .05; unresolved attribution budget .12. Attribution budgets are revisable research judgments.

overlap boundaryCombines the continuous measurement research of the 1997 paper on experienced utility, the 2004 Day Reconstruction Method, and the 2005–06 distinction between experiential and evaluative well-being; it does not treat all happiness research after 2010, policy adoption, or life evaluation as effects of the method.

Evidence gapsThe full texts of the 1997 and 2004 papers, cross-sample validity, and division of development labor have not been closed within this package; the 2010 paper on income and well-being is only a later application and is not separately valued at this outcome point.

Record year2021

summaryOrganized cross-context variation in judgment as an independent problem into a synthesis framework usable by public and management readers.

M rationaleThe three authors jointly delivered a synthesis book with a defined subject; its remaining value in the independent text and organization of the problem is estimated at M5.2. At present, only publication information has been checked; empirical strength and intervention effects are not established by marketing descriptions.

attribution rationaleDaniel Kahneman .24; Olivier Sibony .24; Cass Sunstein .24; the editorial and publishing team of Noise .08; prior work on judgment reliability, measurement, and decision-making .12; unresolved attribution budget .08. Attribution budgets are revisable research judgments.

overlap boundaryCounts only the organization and explanation in the 2021 text coauthored by the three authors of variation among judgments that ought to be the same; it does not claim improvements in medicine, justice, hiring, or other institutions, nor reclaim general heuristics-and-biases theory.

Evidence gapsThe complete book, the division of labor among the three authors, and the cited evidence have not been checked; the benefits, errors, and fairness effects of specific institutional interventions have not been closed.