Morris Chang

Record year1987—1998

summaryChang proposed and articulated a dedicated-foundry model that did not compete with customers, and participated in the business plan and fundraising; the government and ITRI transferred technical assets and personnel, Philips and others supplied capital and industrial conditions, the TSMC team turned the model into continuing manufacturing service, and customers formed an actual market through designs, orders, and validation.

M rationaleM5.8 is on the same level as Watt's mature power system: both integrated existing technology and multi-party organizational inputs into an industrial service operating across years and usable by different customers. The contemporaneous 1998 annual report and independent overviews support actual service and function, but the scope and evidence are still insufficient to reach the urban-infrastructure breadth of Pearl Street M6.3. The old M4–5 did not adequately express the systemic outcome and founding role of cross-year customer-neutral manufacturing service.

attribution rationaleChang receives 0.25 for the model, business plan, fundraising, and organizational direction; ITRI and the government's transfer of plant, equipment, technology, and personnel 0.15; Philips and founding investors 0.10; TSMC engineering, manufacturing, and operations team 0.30; customer designs, orders, and trust 0.10; prior work in semiconductor manufacturing such as RCA licensing 0.05; unknown 0.05. The company endpoint and the individual's share are strictly separated.

overlap boundaryCombines the 1985–1987 ITRI transfer of six-inch technology governance, a demonstration plant, plant, equipment, technology, and 98 professional personnel with the fundraising, opening, and actual cross-year service of a customer-neutral dedicated wafer foundry from 1987–1998 into one delivery chain. The old G09 aggregation is not revived; ITRI transfer, founding, first customers, charter neutrality, and the 1998 endpoint are not separately counted. Excludes subsequent process nodes, all new fabs, revenue and market capitalization, every customer success, the global supply chain, and the entire fabless ecosystem.

Evidence gapsIn 1998, about 3% of world IC supply and about 90% of revenue are company endpoints and cannot be backfilled as year-by-year utility or personal shares. The net accounts for resources, environment, labour, and downstream military and civilian uses are not closed.

Record year1958

summaryChang led multivariable recipe experiments constrained by device physics, and the team implemented combinations of parameters in production, turning a particular product line with almost no producibility into one with a practical yield.

M rationaleM3.6 is above a general tool at M3 because the method achieved a substantial, definable yield recovery on a real production line; it is below a cross-product or cross-institution platform because product identifiers, contemporaneous process logs, output, and net-profit accounts are lacking. Engineering outcomes have no category ceiling; this point is bounded by evidence and scope.

attribution rationaleChang receives 0.45 for leadership in problem diagnosis and parameter methods; the team executing specific experiments, processes, and production 0.30; TI's equipment, organization, and quality conditions 0.10; prior work in transistors and diffusion processes 0.10; unknown 0.05. First-person narration in oral history cannot swallow unnamed engineering and production labour.

overlap boundaryCredits only the process delivery on one difficult germanium diffused-transistor production line in 1958: by repeatedly adjusting temperature, pressure, dopant impurities, germanium-wafer thickness, and base width based on device physics, yield rose from near zero to 20%–30% in about three to four months. Excludes the invention of the transistor, all TI production and profits, later integrated circuits, and TSMC outcomes.

Evidence gapsContemporaneous TI process logs, product identifiers, and team rosters are lacking. Participant oral accounts and industry reporting support the direction and order of magnitude, but cannot establish net profit or precise individual shares.

Record year2009

summaryAfter an abrupt change in demand, the company reorganized two organizations, manufacturing operations and business development, and adjusted capacity. Chang bore responsibility for direction and organization; major investments were authorized by the board and executed by teams.

M rationaleM4.2 reflects a bounded business delivery in which an established large manufacturing-service company completed organizational restructuring and an actual capacity adjustment amid an abrupt change in demand. It is above a mere post or plan, but below the first-decade foundry service at M5.8 because it created no new industrial architecture, and personal decision-making and company-team execution can only be allocated conservatively.

attribution rationaleChang receives 0.20 for returning as CEO, signing the explanation of organizational restructuring, and overall direction; board authorization of major capital 0.20; Operations and manufacturing execution 0.25; Business Development and customer collaboration 0.15; finance, capacity planning, and implementation 0.15; unknown 0.05. The signed shareholder letter supports responsibility for direction, but cannot rewrite plural 'company actions' as unilateral personal decisions.

overlap boundaryCredits only the bounded management delivery in 2009 after Chang returned as CEO in month 6: further reorganizing the company into an Operations Organization and a Business Development Organization, and completing capacity recovery and that year’s advanced-capacity investment when demand rapidly recovered after the downturn. Capital authorization approved by the board in 2009, month 11, is collective governance and a resource condition. Excludes forecasts or plans for 2010, all subsequent processes and capacity, the company’s long-term revenue and market capitalization, and treating the investment amount of 27 hundred million US dollars directly as a quantity of contribution.

Evidence gapsThe shareholder letter does not specify item by item which capacity, restructuring, and customer measures Chang himself proposed, approved, or changed. The specific division of labour among the leaders of each organization, the operations team, and directors is lacking. The net consequences for resources, energy, labour, and downstream military and civilian uses have not been adjudicated.

Record yearLate 1960s

summaryAs a key management liaison, Chang combined the external learning-curve framework with internal costs, prices, and quarterly execution; BCG supplied consulting input and the TI team implemented cost and pricing actions.

M rationaleM3.8 is above a general tool at M3 because the method entered continuing quarterly decisions and was connected to cost reduction and market expansion; evidence consists only of participant recollections, while price lists, cost curves, and contemporaneous authorization archives are lacking, so it is not raised to a cross-company business platform.

attribution rationaleChang's introduction and management execution 0.30; BCG methodological consulting 0.20; TI pricing, finance, manufacturing, and product teams 0.30; prior work in learning-curve economics 0.15; unknown 0.05. Increased market share cannot be used to infer personal exclusivity.

overlap boundaryCredits only the management practice in the late 1960s when Chang was TI's general manager for integrated circuits: working with BCG to apply the learning-curve system to pricing and cost control, and implementing active quarterly price reductions. Excludes origination of the learning-curve concept, all TI market share and profits, medium-scale integrated-product development, and TSMC's business model.

Evidence gapsContemporaneous price lists, cost curves, board authorizations, and BCG project files are lacking. The relative causal role of contemporaneous strategies such as product development has not been disentangled.

Record year2000

summaryChang made an explicit disposition transferring his personal prize to an existing public-benefit vehicle, moving 20,000 US dollars from a personally disposable award into foundation resources.

M rationaleM1.4 is a low-scale but concrete delivery with a specified amount, below a general tool at M3. Recognition of the transfer need not await macro-level educational effects, but a first-party announcement is insufficient to count the effects of the foundation's subsequent projects.

attribution rationaleThe donation disposition was made by Chang: individual 0.90; receiving and accounting-execution institution 0.05; receipt or transfer details unknown 0.05. Award selection is not a co-author of the act of donation.

overlap boundaryCredits only the specific resource transfer in which the 2000 IEEE Noyce Medal's attached 20,000 US dollars were transferred by Chang to the TSMC Education and Culture Foundation. It is not credited with all of the foundation's education, community, arts, and culture projects, nor merged into company ESG or others' philanthropy.

Evidence gapsThe announcement is not a bank receipt of funds received or a foundation project account. Beneficiaries and the effects of subsequent projects are not counted in this M.